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ii. 
Abstract 
We estimate the impact of participating in the NZ Marsden Fund on research output trajectories, 
by comparing the subsequent performance of funded researchers to those who submitted 
proposals but were not funded.  We control for selection bias using the evaluations of the 
proposals generated by the grant selection process. We carry out the analysis in two data frames. 
First we consider the researcher teams behind 1263 second-round proposals submitted 2003-
2008, and look at the post-proposal publication and citation performance of the team as a whole, 
as a function of pre-proposal performance, the ranking of the proposal by the panel, and the 
funding. This estimation does not deal with individual researchers’ multiple proposals and 
funding over time.  To disentangle these effects, we consider the 1500 New Zealand researchers 
who appeared on any of these proposals, and estimate a model predicting annual individual 
performance as a function of previous performance, recent proposal activity, ranking of any 
recent proposals, and funding received through recent proposals. Overall, we find that funding is 
associated with a 6-15% increase in publications and a 22-26% increase in citation-weighted 
papers for research teams.  For individuals, funding is associated with a 3-5% increase in annual 
publications, and a 5-8% increase in citation-weighted papers for 5 years after grant; however, 
the lag structure and persistence of this effect post-grant is difficult to pin down. Surprisingly, we 
find no systematic evidence that the evaluation of proposals by the Marsden system is predictive 
of subsequent success. We conclude that the Marsden Fund is modestly successful in increasing 
scientific performance, but that the selection process does not appear to be effective in 
discriminating among second-round proposals in terms of their likely success. 
JEL codes 
O31, O34, O38 
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3. 
1. Introduction 
New Zealand spends less money on research, relative to its size, than three-quarters of 
the countries in the OECD. The government is considering expanding public funding to narrow 
this gap, but very little is known about the efficacy of existing funding mechanisms. There is a 
long history of programme evaluation in worker training and health delivery settings, but 
systematic evaluation of the effectiveness of government research support programmes is rare 
(Jaffe, 2002).  While many research organizations tout the successes associated with their 
research grants, few make any serious effort to calculate how this rate of success compares to 
what would have occurred absent the programme’s support, i.e. to calculate the “treatment 
effect” associated with receiving funding.  Doing so requires comparing the success of grantees 
with that of a control group, and since the grants are explicitly made to those potential recipients 
judged most likely to succeed, any such comparison must control for selection bias. 
The Marsden Fund is the premiere funding mechanism for basic research in New 
Zealand.  It is funded by the government, but selection and administration is delegated to the 
Royal Society of New Zealand (RSNZ).  With the intent to evaluate the Fund, the RSNZ has 
maintained records of the researchers associated with both successful and unsuccessful 
proposals, as well as the evaluation metrics (external referee scores, panel scores and panel ranks) 
of all of those proposals by the expert panels that form the basis of the funding decisions.  This 
allows us to estimate the impact of receiving funding while controlling, via the evaluation scores, 
for the selectivity bias, separating the overall difference in success between the funded and 
unfunded teams into a selection effect and a treatment effect. 
We look at the effects of the grant process on research output in two ways.  First, we 
consider the researcher teams and look at the post-proposal publication and citation performance 
of the team as a whole, as a function of pre-proposal performance, the ranking of the proposal 
by the panel, and the funding received. We do this both with OLS and count model estimation 
of a parametric functional form for the relationship between research outputs and prior research 
outputs, Marsden funding, and the panel ranking, and with a non-parametric regression 
discontinuity design, simply comparing the success of the proposals just above the funding 
cutoff with the success of those just below the cut-off.  Aggregating impacts in this way across 
team members and across years mitigates the inherent noisiness of publication output, and is 
robust to variations in the time lags between grant activity and scholarly output. But this 
approach cannot sort out the effect of multiple interactions with the Marsden programme on 
researchers’ scholarly output over time.  The average researcher on these teams made 6 
proposals and received 1.2 grants 2000-2012.  When we look at the post-proposal performance 
of a team—whether funded or not in a given round—it will typically include researchers who 
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were also on other current or subsequent proposal teams, some of which were funded and some 
of which were not.  To disentangle these effects, we consider all researchers who appeared on 
any of these proposals, and assemble their publications/citations, proposals, the evaluation of 
those proposals, and funding decisions on an annual basis.  We estimate models on this panel 
predicting annual researcher performance as a function of previous performance, recent 
proposal activity, Marsden evaluations of any recent proposals, and funding received through 
recent proposals. 
As a side-effect of estimating the parametric model of the selection and treatment effects, 
we learn something about how well the Marsden evaluation process predicts the future success 
of the proposals.  The results suggest that receiving funding through the Marsden Fund does 
increase the success of the funded proposals, but that the various evaluations used to select 
funding recipients are themselves not systematically correlated with proposals’ or researchers’ 
subsequent performance.  In other words, the study was constructed to separate the treatment 
effect from the selection effect, but in these data the selection effect does not seem to be 
present. 
 
2. Background 
2.1. Previous work 
Arora et al. (2000) present a structural model with endogenous decisions by applicants 
and the granting agency. It evaluates the impact of funding from an Italian biotechnology 
programme using a large and comprehensive dataset of proposals to the biotechnology and bio-
instrumentation programme from 1989 to 1993, using impact-factor-weighted publications as the 
measure of output.  It found an estimated structural elasticity of research output with respect to 
the granted budget of about 0.6 but varying depending on research characteristics.  This elasticity 
is estimated taking into account that previously successful researchers are more likely to be 
funded and, knowing this, request larger budget allocations. 
Arora & Gambardella (2005) study the impact of National Science Foundation (NSF) 
funding on economics researchers in the USA, comparing the research output of successful and 
unsuccessful applicants in a difference-in-difference framework. Using data from 1473 
applications to the NSF from 1985 to 1990, they find that funding is associated with increased 
research output for younger economists, but not for senior applicants. 
Jaffe (2002) (which was actually written after Arora and Gambardella (2005)) discusses 
the practicalities of different approaches to measuring the impact of public funding in the 
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presence of selection bias, using as a benchmark the possibilty of a randomized control trial 
(“RCT”).  It suggests that under typical grant programme circumstances, the regression-
discontinuity approach introduced by Thistlethwaite & Campbell (1960) provides almost as good 
an estimate of the funding effect as the realistic RCT formulation. 
A closely related methodology was used by Jacob & Lefgren (2011) to evaluate the 
impact of funding by the U.S. National Institute of Health (NIH) on research output.  They 
compared successful and unsuccessful research proposals to the NIH from 1980 to 2000, using 
the priority scores from independent scientific reviews to control for selection bias. The NIH 
allocates funding in such a way that there is a highly non-linear relationship between priority 
scores and likelihood of being funded. This non-linearity is exploited in an instrumental variables 
framework to estimate the effect of funding purged of selectivity bias. Funding is associated with 
a 7% increase in publications over the 5-10 years post-funding. The IV and OLS estimates are 
qualitatively similar, suggesting that within this group of applying researchers the selectivity bias 
is not large. The authors argue that the small estimated effect is consistent with a model where 
the loss of an NIH grant is simply replaced by other sources of funding. They explore how being 
funded by the NIH affects future funding, and how non-NIH funded researchers are funded 
elsewhere. They find that most non-NIH funded researchers are funded elsewhere, and those 
who get NIH funding are less likely to receive NSF funding.  This highlights the difference 
between the direct effect of a particular funding programme and its effect when viewed in 
interaction with other programmes.  We return to this issue below. 
Li and Agha (2015) looked at scientific outputs (papers, citations, patent citations) 
associated with more than 130,000 research project (R01) grants funded by the U.S. National 
Institutes of Health from1980 to 2008. It finds that better peer-review scores are consistently 
associated with better research outcomes and that this relationship persists even after controlling 
for an investigator’s publication history, grant history, institutional affiliations, career stage, and 
degree types. A one–standard deviation worse peer-review score among awarded grants is 
associated with 15% fewer citations, 7% fewer publications, 19% fewer high-impact publications, 
and 14% fewer follow-on patents. For high-impact publications, they try counts of publications 
in the top 5%, 1% and .1% of all publications in the same year; they find predictive power for 
the referee score at all of these levels. This is the largest and most thorough study we identified 
of the predictive value of referee scores. It shows effects that are of modest but important size. 
Of course, in looking only at successful proposals, this work says nothing about the treatment 
effect. 
Moving to the New Zealand and in particular the Marsden Fund context, a bibliometric 
analysis of the Fund was undertaken in 2001 comparing the number and impact of publications 
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of Marsden Funded research teams to non-Marsden Funded publications (Knox (2004)). Across 
all fields, over the period 1997 to 2001 the Marsden Funded share of New Zealand authored 
publications rose from 2.2% to 7.7%. Marsden Funded publications were on average cited 1.7 
times more than the non-Marsden Funded counterparts. As noted above, however, a study of 
this kind does not distinguish the extent to which the Marsden Fund is good at identifying the 
best research from the extent to which the receipt of funding increases research output. 
 
2.2. Institutional Setting 
The Marsden Fund was established in 1994 by the New Zealand Government to support 
New Zealand science on a competitive basis1. The fund is named after Sir Ernest Marsden, a 
prominent New Zealand born researcher who inspired physicist Ernest Rutherford to continue 
research into the structure of the atom. In 2013, $67.9 million was allocated in research grants 
through the Marsden Fund.2 In a typical year, the Marsden Fund receives approximately 1000 
proposals, and funds around 100 of those.  The government delegates the administration of the 
programme, including the selection of grantees from among applicants, to the Royal Society of 
New Zealand (RSNZ), which was modelled after the Royal Society in Britain and is loosely 
analogous to the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) in the U.S. In this, the RSNZ acts on 
behalf of the Government-appointed Marsden Fund Council. 
Proposal review is carried out by assessment panels of between 5 and 10 members 
appointed by the Royal Society.  The overall budget is allocated to each panel by the RSNZ.  
Given the small size of the programme, each of these panels is rather broad in coverage; for 
example one is “Physical Sciences and Engineering” and one is “Economics and Human 
Behaviour.”  A list of the panels and their sizes over 2003-2008 is presented in the Appendix. 
A proposal research team is made up of as few as one researcher, or as many as 8. A 
team can be made up of Principle Investigators, Associate Investigators, Post Docs, Research 
Assistants/Technicians, and Post Graduate Students. The budget specifies the fraction of full 
time (FTE) that each investigator proposes to devote to the project.3  There are two types of 
grant given by the Marsden Fund. The standard grant is for any research team, and can run for 
up to three years.  The maximum budget varied slightly by year and panel, but was on the order 
of NZD 300,000 per year.4  Applicants within 7 years of their PhD award have the option of 
                                                 
1 http://www.royalsociety.org.nz/programmes/funds/marsden/about/background/ 
2 http://assets.royalsociety.org.nz/media/2014/07/Profiling-Excellence-2013-web.pdf 
3 Proposals can and do include investigators with zero FTE, i.e. they are associated with the project but will not be 
paid from the budget.  In particular, non-New Zealand researchers can be included in proposals but cannot be paid 
from the proposal budget. 
4 The NZD is worth approximately US$0.65. 
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apply for a “Fast-Start” (“FS”) grant, which is limited to NZD 100,000 per year.  FS proposals 
are ranked against other FS applicants rather than being compared with the general pool.  Each 
panel decides how much of its allocated budget to use for FS and how much for the standard 
grants. 
The application process has two stages. A one-page initial proposal is reviewed by the 
panel without benefit of external referees. Each proposal is reviewed by a subset of the panel and 
given a preliminary score, based on the merit of the proposal and the potential of the project 
team. On this basis, the panels reject 71-84 percent of the proposals, with each panel deciding 
internally how many proposals to advance to the second stage.  In the second stage, longer 
proposals are submitted and sent to external (including international) anonymous referees for 
review.  Proponents are given an opportunity to respond to referee comments, and then the 
panels score these proposals based on the referee reports, the proponents’ responses, their own 
judgment, and discussion within the panel.  Each panel chooses a cutoff for regular proposals 
and a cutoff for Fast-start proposals, such that funding the proposals with rank above that cutoff 
fits within the allocated budget. 
 
3. Analysis of performance of proposal teams 
3.1. Regression model 
This analysis is based on 1263 Marsden proposals from the second round reviews for the 
years 2003-2008.  Overall, 41% of the proposals were funded.  About 25% of the proposals were 
Fast-Start proposals, and of these slightly more than half were funded.  We measure the research 
success of each proposal team by identifying all of the publications of all team members, and all 
citations received by those publications, from 1995 through 2012.  This information was 
collected from Scopus based on the researchers listed in the proposals appearing as publication 
authors. Thus we are not making any attempt to identify publications specifically related to the 
research as described in the proposal.  We are simply investigating the relationship between 
researchers’ overall research output and their participation in the Marsden process. 
For each proposal i submitted in year t, we consider the prior success of that research 
team to be proxied by their publications (or citations) received from 1995 until year t-1, and the 
subsequent success to be proxied by their publications (or citations) received from year t+1 
through 2012.  We capture the panel’s subjective evaluation of each proposal (and control for 
selection bias) using its “scaled rank,” defined as 1 minus the ratio of the integer ranking 
assigned by the panel (where the best proposal is assigned rank 1) to the total number of 
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proposals ranked by the panel (i.e. lowest rank for that panel).  Thus scaled rank is 0 for the 
lowest rank proposals and approaches unity (1-1/n) for the top ranked proposals.  This scaling 
allows the rank to be comparable across panels in which different numbers of proposals were 
evaluated. 
Our core analysis is based on the following variables: 
Dependent variables  
Publications (annual) The number of publications authored by members of the 
research team after the proposal, scaled by the number of years 
until 2012. i.e. ௣௢௦௧	௣௥௢௣௢௦௔௟	௣௨௕௟௜௖௔௧௜௢௡௦ଶ଴ଵଶି௬௘௔௥  
Citations (annual) The number of citations to publications authored by members of 
the research team after the proposal, scaled by the number of 
years until 2012. i.e. ௣௢௦௧	௣௥௢௣௢௦௔௟	௖௜௧௔௧௜௢௡௦ଶ଴ଵଶି௬௘௔௥  
Log[(publications + 1)] The natural log of post proposal publications as follows: 
ܮ݋݃(௣௢௦௧	௣௥௢௣௢௦௔௟	௣௨௕௟௜௖௔௧௜௢௡௦ାଵଶ଴ଵଶି௬௘௔௥ ) 
Log[(citations + 1)]  The natural log of post proposal citations as follows: 
ܮ݋݃(௣௢௦௧	௣௥௢௣௢௦௔௟	௖௜௧௔௧௜௢௡௦ାଵଶ଴ଵଶି௬௘௔௥ ) 
Independent variables  
Log(Past performance+1) The natural log of publications or citations to publications 
authored by members of the research team before the proposal 
as follows: ܮ݋݃(௣௥௘ ௣௥௢௣௢௦௔௟ ௣௨௕௟௜௖௔௧௜௢௡௦/௖௜௧௔௧௜௢௡௦ାଵ௬௘௔௥ିଵଽଽ଺ ) 
Log(Past performance) The natural log of publications or citations to publications 
authored by members of the research team before the proposal, 
scaled by the number of years since 1996. If past 
publications/citations equals zero, this is set to zero.  i.e. 
 ܮ݋݃(௣௥௘	௣௥௢௣௢௦௔௟	௣௘௥௙௢௥௠௔௡௖௘௬௘௔௥ିଵଽଽ଺ ) if ݌ݎ݁	݌ݎ݋݌݋ݏ݈ܽ	݌݁ݎ݂݋ݎ݉ܽ݊ܿ݁ ≥ 1 
0                                                      if ݌ݎ݁ ݌ݎ݋݌݋ݏ݈ܽ	݌݁ݎ݂݋ݎ݉ܽ݊ܿ݁ = 0 
Dummy: Past 
performance=0 
Dummy equals 1 if past performance (publications or citations) is 
zero. A dummy correction for Log(Past performance) to 
distinguish between those with no publications/citations and 
those with an average of one per year (Log1=0). 
Funded A dummy variable equal to 1 if the proposal was funded. 
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Fast-Start A dummy variable equal to 1 if the proposal was a Fast-Start 
proposal.  
FS*Funded An interaction term between ‘Funded’ and ‘Fast-Start’ 
Scaled Rank The panel rank the proposal received during the second round 
scaled by panel size. Ranges to 0 (lowest ranked) and approaches 
1 (highest ranked)   
Average referee score The average external referee score received by the proposal 
during the second round. Ranges from 1 (top 5% proposals) to 5 
(below average). 
Log(FTE) The natural log of the full time equivalent (FTE) of proposal 
investigators recorded in the proposal. 
Budget (NZ$million) The size of the funded budget (in millions of NZ dollars). 
FS*budget An interaction term between ‘Fast-Start’ and ‘Budget’. 
Subsequent contract A dummy variable equal to 1 if any member of the proposal team 
received funding from any year t+1 to 2012.  
Overdispersion: lnalpha The natural log of alpha - the over-dispersion parameter 
associated with negative binomial regressions. Alpha equals 0 in a 
Poisson regression. 
Panel Dummies Nine panel dummies: equals 1 if proposal i is submitted to the 
corresponding panel. ‘BMS’ is omitted from regressions. 
Time dummies Six year dummies: equals 1 if t equals the corresponding year. 
2003 is omitted from regressions. 
By including previous performance in the regression, we model success as likely to be 
persistent over time, with participants being on different success trajectories, but with the 
possibilities that the Marsden process shifts that trajectory.  By including a dummy for Fast-Start 
proposals, we allow for the possibility that these (younger) investigators are on different 
trajectories than the average “Standard” proposal team.  By including the interaction term 
between the Fast-Start dummy and the Funding dummy, we allow for the possibility that these 
younger investigators benefit differentially from the receipt of funding. 
Panel dummies allow for the overall rate of publication and citation to differ across 
disciplines, and time dummies absorb the fact that the post-application intervals are of different 
durations for proposals from different years. We thereby assume that the proportional impact of 
Marsden funding is the same across fields and across observation periods of differing length. 
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Finally, we include the dummy variable for subsequent funding because we are not attempting to 
identify the extent to which subsequent publications are directly tied to the research funded in 
the proposal whose effects we are trying to measure.  For any given competitive round, there will 
be researchers, both among those funded and those rejected, who subsequently received funding 
from the Marsden programme in a subsequent competitive round.  Since we measure publication 
success for all teams out to 2012, we would expect that this subsequent proposal activity could 
also be reflected in the overall subsequent performance of the teams. 
 
3.2. Regression results 
Descriptive statistics for the regression variables are presented in Table 1. Baseline OLS 
regression results using the log of performance-plus-one (scaled by the number of years pre or 
post submission) are presented in Table 2.  The interpretation of all of the variable coefficients is 
the percentage increase in the performance measure, regardless of whether the base for that year 
and discipline is high or low. We add one to the publication and citation counts before taking 
logs because a very small number of observations have zero publications or zero citations either 
before or after the proposal round. We have also estimated the OLS log-log equations dropping 
the observations with zero publications or citations and the results are almost identical to those 
reported.   
Table 1: Summary statistics on proposal-team dataset 
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
Past publications 70.96041 71.26 0 >500 
Future publications 70.72051 66.57817 0 >400 
Past citations 2829.276 3594.865 0 >25000 
Future citations 1054.112 1480.084 0 >14000 
Future publications per year 11.31195 10.08695 0 63 
Past publications per year 7.305418 7.027658 0 57.18182 
Future cites per year 161.5095 203.414 0 1849.125 
Past cites per year 292.7203 365.6876 0 2839 
Log(past pubs per year) 1.442799 1.231489 -2.48491 4.046236 
Log(past cites per year) 4.619873 1.979748 -2.48491 7.951207 
Scaled rank 0.458334 0.28851 0 0.966667 
Funded 0.408551 0.491761 0 1 
Fast Start 0.249406 0.432841 0 1 
FS*Funded 0.122724 0.32825 0 1 
Subsequent contract 0.335709 0.472425 0 1 
Investigator FTE 1.41563 1.003453 0 9.27 
budget 0.180517 0.268883 0 1.243264 
budget (Funded subsample) 0.441847 0.247939 0.041479 1.243264 
budget (Funded FS subsample) 0.138839 0.055838 0.041479 0.302222 
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Percentage zeros % of teams
No past publications 3.40%
No past citations 3.64%
No future publications 1.58%
No future citations 3.17%
 
Columns 1 and 4 present the simplest test for a funding effect, without attempting to 
correct for selection bias.  They indicate that funding is associated with an increase in 
publications of about 6% and citations about 12% relative to what would have been predicted 
based on previous performance.  The coefficient on previous performance is approximately .75, 
and highly significant statistically, indicating that there is significant persistence in success but 
with some regression to the mean (coefficient less than unity). 
Columns 2 and 5 include the addition of the proposal’s scaled rank, the Fast-Start 
dummy, the interaction term between Fast-Start and Funding, and the dummy for subsequent 
funding.  The treatment effect associated with funding is increased to 15% for publications and 
26% for citations.  Fast-Start teams are associated with about 16% greater research output 
(controlling for pre-proposal performance), consistent with these younger investigators being, on 
average, on a steeper upward output trajectory than other researchers.  The interaction term 
between Fast-Start and Funding is, however, essentially zero, indicating that there is no 
observable tendency for these younger researchers to benefit differentially from the receipt of 
funding. 
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Table 2: OLS Log-Log baseline regressions for proposal-team data 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Pubs Pubs ΔPubs Cites Cites ΔCites 
              
Log(Past Performance + 
1) 0.766*** 0.787*** 0.733*** 0.734***   
  (0.0144) (0.0156) (0.0149) (0.0155)   
Funded 0.0638** 0.145*** 0.126** 0.124*** 0.264*** 0.255***
  (0.0291) (0.0516) (0.0553) (0.0456) (0.0807) (0.0897) 
Fast-Start 0.154*** 0.329*** 0.159** 0.412***
  (0.0465) (0.0480) (0.0716) (0.0779) 
FS*Funded 0.0327 0.0572 -0.0242 -0.00149
  (0.0645) (0.0691) (0.101) (0.112) 
Subsequent contract 0.160*** 0.0912*** 0.338*** 0.222***
  (0.0328) (0.0348) (0.0513) (0.0565) 
Scaled rank -0.214*** -0.217** -0.293** -0.360***
  (0.0798) (0.0856) (0.125) (0.139) 
Constant 0.554*** 0.444*** 0.0926 0.755*** 0.583*** -0.806***
  (0.0627) (0.0658) (0.0650) (0.121) (0.125) (0.106) 
Observations 1,263 1,263 1,263 1,263 1,263 1,263 
R-squared 0.822 0.829 0.186 0.840 0.847 0.135 
Time and panel dummies included in all regressions 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The positive coefficient on the subsequent funding dummy is quite significant 
statistically.  On average proposal teams (both those funded in the current round and those 
denied in the current round) that had a team member who received funding in some subsequent 
round received about 17% more publications and 35% more citations than those that did not.  It 
was this finding that led us to the investigator-year model discussed below. 
The surprising result in columns 2 and 5 is that the coefficient on scaled rank is negative.  
This means that, controlling for the other regressors—including the effect of the funding itself—
proposal teams that were highly ranked by the RSNZ panels actually performed worse than 
those that were ranked lower.  Specifically, because the rank is scaled so that it is roughly one for 
the best-ranked proposal and zero for the worst, the coefficient of -.2 to -.3 means that the worst 
ranked proposal team got 20-30% more output than the best team, after controlling for all other 
attributes, including previous performance.5 
                                                 
5 If previous performance is excluded from the regression, the coefficient on scaled rank is essentially zero, 
suggesting that the negative estimate conditional on previous performance may reflect a tendency for panels to 
overweight past performance in predicting future performance. 
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The combination of the funding and rank effects is shown graphically in Figure 1: 
Relationship between residuals and scaled rankFigure 1.  To construct this Figure, the log-
citations variable was regressed on year dummies, field dummies, and previous log-citations.  The 
Figure then plots the residuals from this regression by scaled rank, and distinguishes those 
proposals that were funded from those that were not.  These plotted points are therefore the 
post-proposal performance of each team, after taking out the effects of previous performance, 
year and discipline.  The pattern is not particularly distinguishable by eye because the effect is 
small and the scatter is large, but the funded points are, on average, slightly higher than the 
unfunded points, and, at the same time, within both the funded and unfunded groups there is a 
slightly downward trend with rank.6 
Figure 1: Relationship between residuals and scaled rank 
  
 
Columns 3 and 6 of Table 2 take the difference in the log-performance measure before 
and after the proposal round as the dependent variable.  This corresponds to the regression in 
the previous column, except that the coefficient on previous performance is constrained to be 
unity.  Since this constraint is strongly rejected by the data, we prefer the formulation where the 
relationship between ex post and ex ante performance is allowed to be determined by the data.  
                                                 
6 There are a handful of zero-rank proposals that were nonetheless funded visible in the figure.  This is 
because the Fast-Start proposals are ranked separately from the regular proposals, and in a couple of instances 
panels received very few Fast-Start proposals and chose to fund them all. 
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But we show the constrained version as well because it corresponds to the “difference in 
difference” estimator of the funding effect, which is frequently used in this context (e.g. Arora 
and Gambardella, 2005).  The estimated effects are all qualitatively similar to those in the 
previous column, with the exception of the Fast-Start effect, which is about twice as big in the 
difference formulation.  This makes sense: the Fast-Start applicants have lower previous 
performance; when we constrain previous performance to have a unitary impact on subsequent 
performance their ex post performance is under-predicted; the increase in the Fast-Start dummy 
compensates for this and so fits the data better. 
Table 3: Negative Binomial baseline regressions for proposal-team data 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Pubs Pubs Cites Cites 
          
Count regression:     
Log(past performance) 0.727*** 0.747*** 0.636*** 0.663*** 
  (0.0155) (0.0167) (0.0151) (0.0162) 
Dummy: Past performance=0 -1.947*** -1.990*** -1.472*** -1.421*** 
  (0.279) (0.279) (0.235) (0.232) 
Funded 0.0256 0.0644 0.159*** 0.222*** 
  (0.0256) (0.0454) (0.0417) (0.0730) 
Fast-Start   0.132*** 0.170** 
    (0.0460) (0.0668) 
FS*Funded   0.0401 0.113 
    (0.0645) (0.0936) 
Scaled rank   -0.114 -0.237** 
    (0.0722) (0.115) 
Subsequent contract   0.0863*** 0.313*** 
    (0.0291) (0.0452) 
Constant 0.787*** 0.695*** 1.720*** 1.371*** 
  (0.0599) (0.0638) (0.116) (0.124) 
Overdispersion: lnalpha     
Constant -2.555*** -2.594*** -0.779*** -0.840*** 
  (0.0928) (0.0941) (0.0413) (0.0416) 
Observations 1,263 1,263 1,263 1,263 
Log likelihood -3367 -3351 -6669 -6632 
Time and panel dummies included in all regressions 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 3 converts these regressions into a more formal count data framework. The 
dependent performance variable is left in raw form – count of publications or citations to these 
publications, scaled by the number of years until 2012. The scaling factor does result in some 
non-integer dependent variable observations which is not strictly a count. However, the models 
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perform well, and produce similar results to unscaled counts.7 For the independent variable, we 
take the natural log of past performance and set this equal to zero if past performance equals 
zero. To distinguish between observations with past performance equals one (log1=0) and those 
where the log has been manually set to zero, we include a dummy correction equal to one if past 
performance is zero. It was found that conditional over-dispersion in our data warranted the use 
of a negative binomial model rather than a Poisson model, as the latter constrains the variance to 
equal the mean. While not precisely correct, the resulting coefficients are approximately equal to 
percentage effects for small changes.  
Many of these regression findings are comparable to those from Table 2. Performance 
demonstrates persistent but mean reverting success with a coefficient on past performance of 
around 0.75 for publications and 0.65 for citations. The dummy correction is strongly negative 
indicating that those teams with past performance equals zero are expected to produce less in the 
future than those team with past performance equal to one. Fast-Start has a positive coefficient 
of 0.13 for publications and 0.17 for citations, while the interaction term is statistically zero – 
younger investigators are still found to be on a steeper upward trajectory than their more senior 
counterparts but do not benefit differentially from funding. A team member receiving a 
subsequent contract is still associated with a positive and statistically significant increase in future 
performance. The coefficient on scaled rank remains negative and significant for citations, but 
loses significance for publications. The adjustment of most note is that the effect of receiving 
funding is no longer significant for publications, however for citations a coefficient of 0.16 to 
0.22 remains significant at the 1% level.  
Table 4 tests the robustness of these results to some alternative model specifications.  To 
conserve space we show these variations only for the citations performance measure, but results 
for publications are analogous. Using scaled rank to control for selection bias relies on an 
assumption about the functional form of the relationship between rank and performance; there 
is of course no reason why that relationship should be linear. Acting on the prior that panels 
might be able to identify very strong applicants and/or very weak applicants, but struggle to rank 
those in between, we replace scaled rank with two dummies in column one: high scaled rank 
equals one if the proposal received a scaled rank of 0.9 or higher, and low scaled rank if the rank 
was 0.2 or below. Neither had significant coefficients and so this does not appear to be a fruitful 
direction.   
  
                                                 
7 Horton, Kim and Saitz (2007) have argued that non-integer scaled values for dependent variables do not 
create a practical problem for count model estimation. 
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Table 4: Negative Binomial Regression variants on proposal-team data 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Cites Cites Cites Cites FTE*Cites Cites 
Count regression:   
Log(Past performance) 0.663*** 0.661*** 0.662*** 0.661*** 0.667*** 0.660***
  (0.0162) (0.0162) (0.0162) (0.0163) (0.0162) (0.0162) 
Dummy: Past 
Performance=0 -1.417*** -1.412*** -1.405*** -1.400*** -1.661*** -1.420***
  (0.232) (0.232) (0.232) (0.232) (0.269) (0.232) 
Funded 0.157*** 0.105** 0.146*** 0.220*** 0.210***   
  (0.0551) (0.0466) (0.0539) (0.0729) (0.0723)   
Fast-Start 0.178*** 0.196*** 0.184*** 0.207*** 0.218*** 0.243***
  (0.0667) (0.0657) (0.0661) (0.0724) (0.0726) (0.0639) 
FS*Funded 0.121 0.118 0.117 0.110 0.112   
  (0.0951) (0.0937) (0.0936) (0.0936) (0.0942)   
Subsequent contract 0.309*** 0.305*** 0.307*** 0.309*** 0.308*** 0.303***
  (0.0451) (0.0451) (0.0451) (0.0453) (0.0450) (0.0453) 
Dummy: High scaled rank -0.0746   
  (0.0882)   
Dummy: Low scaled rank 0.0797   
  (0.0508)   
Average referee score 0.0528   
  (0.0348)   
Scaled rank -0.230** -0.209* -0.0958 
  (0.115) (0.114) (0.107) 
log(FTE) 0.0478 0.377***   
  (0.0375) (0.0417)   
budget (NZ$million) 0.233** 
  (0.111) 
FS*budget 0.789 
  (0.571) 
Constant 1.290*** 1.351*** 1.192*** 1.369*** 1.330*** 1.414***
  (0.128) (0.123) (0.161) (0.123) (0.122) (0.124) 
Overdispersion: lnalpha   
Constant -0.840*** -0.837*** -0.839*** -0.842*** -0.863*** -0.833***
  (0.0416) (0.0416) (0.0416) (0.0416) (0.0418) (0.0415) 
Observations 1,263 1,263 1,263 1,262 1,262 1,263 
Log likelihood -6633 -6634 -6633 -6628 -6801 -6637 
Time and panel dummies included in all regressions 
Standard errors in parentheses 
Regression 5 weights citations by the FTE of investigators stated in the proposal 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The argument for including scaled rank in the regression was to control for a selection 
effect, but that argument assumes that rank is positively associated with performance.  Given 
that we find a negative relationship between rank and performance, it is less clear that the best 
way to test for a funding effect is after controlling for the relationship between rank and 
performance.  Further, if the “true” relationship between rank and performance is non-linear, 
then the finding of a negative rank effect and a positive funding effect might simply reflect a 
negative rank effect that operates only over low rank but not higher rank.  To explore this issue, 
Column two of Table 4 simply drops rank from the regression entirely.  The effect is, again, to 
reduce the estimated treatment effect to about 0.11 although it remains highly significant 
statistically.  This suggests that the estimated funding effect is not solely an artefact of the 
negative relationship between performance and rank.  As discussed further below, whether the 
“right” estimate for the funding effect is that with or without the rank variable in the regression 
is largely one of interpretation. 
In column three we replace scaled rank with the average referee score which ranges from 
1 (top 5% of proposals) to 5 (below average). There is some evidence in the international 
literature that panel discussions of collated referee scores worsen rather than improving the 
selection process. (Fogelholm, et al, 2012). We were therefore interested to see whether the 
unprocessed referee scores were more predictive of success than panel rank. The coefficient, 
however, is not significant.  
As noted above, we are measuring success in terms of the overall publication output of 
the proposal team members.  But a researcher’s participation in a Marsden proposal can range 
between zero FTE and full-time.  One might think that the effect of participation in the Marsden 
process would be greatest for those researchers most involved in the proposal, which might be 
proxied by their FTE as stated in the proposal.  Columns 4 and 5 of Table 4 investigate this 
possibility.  In Column 4, we simply add the log of total budgeted FTE to the regression.  Its 
effect is zero, although the estimated effect of funding increases in magnitude.  In Column 5, we 
change the dependent variable, weighting all of the citations received by papers authored by team 
members by total budgeted investigators FTE in the proposal.  The coefficient on funding 
remains higher at 0.21, log(FTE) unsurprisingly turns very significantly positive and yet the other 
coefficients barely change. These results would seem to suggest that at this team-aggregate level 
we cannot distinguish differential impact of funding based on the different funding levels of the 
team members. Note that foreign investigators included in proposals always have FTE of zero. 
Thus this variation excludes their publications and demonstrates that the findings are not 
significantly affected by how foreign investigators are treated. 
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Finally, Column 6 of Table 3 retains the basic structure of Table 3 Column 4 but replaces 
the dummy variable for receiving funding with the actual budgeted dollar amount (set to zero for 
those proposals that were not funded).  The estimated coefficient of 0.233 corresponds, 
approximately, to funding of $1 million NZD being associated with a 23% increase in citations. 
The nonlinear nature of the model precludes direct extrapolation to other budget amounts, but 
this is qualitatively similar to the other models given that the average grant over this period was 
about NZD 580K. Note that the Fast-Start-budget interaction term coefficient of .789 suggests 
that on average Fast-Start proposals get a much bigger boost per dollar than regular proposals, but 
this coefficient is very imprecisely estimated.  Since overall winning Fast-Start proposals are 
given about one-third as much money as winning regular proposals, the previous result that they 
get about the same boost as regular proposals on a dummy-variable yes/no basis is also 
consistent with their getting a bigger boost per budget dollar, but the imprecision with which all 
of the Fast-Start effects is estimated makes it hard to make strong statements. 
To this point, we have allowed each disciplinary pool to have its own average 
publication/citation level, but have constrained the other regressors to have the same effect 
across disciplines.  Table 6 (publications) and Table 7 (citations) presents the results of 
estimating negative binomial regressions separately for each disciplinary panel or pool.  
Unfortunately, the results are extremely noisy.  Although the effect of prior performance is .6 to 
.8, for every panel, the other coefficients of interest are very imprecisely estimated and the point 
estimates vary a lot.  The effect of funding on publications is positive and statistically significant 
only for Biomedical Sciences. For citations, Biomedical Sciences, Mathematics and Information 
Sciences and Social Sciences panels have statistically positive funding effects.  The coefficient on 
scaled rank is negative and significant for several panels.  
 
3.3. Regression discontinuity estimates 
The advantage of the regression analysis described in the previous section is that it allows 
us to use all of the data on funded and unfunded proposals in the attempt to measure the effect 
of funding on research output.  The disadvantage is that it is dependent on functional form 
assumptions to control for differences between the funded and unfunded proposals other than 
their funding status.  Further, it assumes that the “treatment effect” associated with funding is 
the same for all proposals, whereas in reality very high-ranked and very low-ranked proposals 
might enjoy different benefits from receiving funding.  An alternative is to use regression-
discontinuity methods, which essentially estimate similar regressions to the models presented 
above, but utilize only those observations that fall in some pre-selected “bandwidth” around the 
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cutoff point along the rank ordering (Benavente et al (2012)).  This means that the results are less 
sensitive to functional form, and provide an accurate estimate of the “local” funding effect, i.e. 
the effect of funding on proposals that are near the funding margin. 
We explored using this approach to estimate the Marsden funding effect, using 
bandwidth of 6 proposals on either side of the cutoff and the log-log specification from Table 2.  
The results produce an estimate of about .12 for the funding effect, with a standard error of 
about .21.  It appears that signal/noise ratio of this effect is too small to identify it with any 
precision using only the observations in the vicinity of the cutoff. 
 
4. Modelling performance of individual researchers 
4.1. Regression Model 
We begin with all of the named investigators who appear on any of the proposals 
considered in the previous section.  This is about 2300 individuals which we then restrict to New 
Zealand based researchers, bringing us to around 1500 individuals. We deem New Zealand 
researchers to be our sample of interest as they are financially eligible for Marsden grants and are 
more likely to repeatedly interact with the Fund.8 We then identified all of the first-round and 
second-round proposals (since 2000) and research contracts (since 1996) on which these 
researchers appeared.  We have also captured the first round panel score, first round panel rank, 
second round referee scores, second round panel score and second round panel rank for all of 
these proposals since 2003. We have assembled these data into a researcher-year panel, 1996-
2012, incorporating their publication and citation record.  Not surprisingly, many of these 
researchers participated in multiple proposals over that period and some of them received 
multiple grants.  The overall frequency distribution of first and second round proposals and 
grants/contracts is shown in Figure 2.  As can be seen, about 90% of these researchers 
submitted two or more preliminary proposals, 60% submitted two or more full proposals and 
30% received two or more contracts from 2000-2012. This pattern motivates our decision to 
switch to a panel that allows for analysis of multiple proposal submissions and contract receipts. 
 
  
                                                 
8 Marsden Fund guidelines stipulate that overseas researchers may be members of proposal teams but are not 
eligible to receive funds. 
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Figure 2: Frequency distribution of preliminary (1st stage) proposals, full (2nd stage) 
proposals and contracts by investigator, 2000-2012 
 
Sample: New Zealand based researchers who have submitted at least one full proposal. 
 
In our regression analysis of these data, we restrict observations to only those individuals 
who have submitted second round proposals in the preceding five years. We do this so as to 
make this section analogous to the above proposal-team quasi-experimental approach and to 
reduce the noise associated with incorporating individuals who are no longer, or not yet, research 
active. We then regress a dynamic model of current performance (citations or publications) on 
past performance, past contracts and controls. We begin our timeframe in 2004 so as to allow 
for sufficient lags. The variables of interest are listed below: 
 
Dependent variables  
Publications The number of publications authored in time t 
Normalised citations  The number of citations to publications authored in time t, 
normalised by panel and year. The mean of citations-per-
publication was normalised to one for each panel in each year – 
this non-parametrically adjusts for discipline heterogeneity and 
the phenomenon that older publications have longer time-frames 
to accrue citations. 
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Independent variables  
Log(Average Performance 
over past 5 years) 
The log of mean publications or mean normalised citations 
across t-1 to t-5. If the mean equals zero, the value is set to zero.  
Dummy: Performance in 
past 5 years=0 
Dummy equals 1 if mean performance (publications or citations-
per-year) across t-1 to t-5 is zero. A dummy correction for 
Log(Average Performance over past 5 years) to distinguish 
between those with no publications/normalised citations and 
those with an average of one per year (Log1=0). 
Number of contracts in 
past five years 
The sum of contracts (funded proposals) received in t-1 to t-5.
Best lagged scaled rank The maximum scaled rank for a full (second stage) proposal in t-
1 to t-5. As per the research team regressions, this ranges from 
zero (lowest ranked in panel) and approaches unity (highest 
ranked in panel). 
Best lagged percent grade The maximum percentage grade for a full (second stage) proposal 
in t-1 to t-5. Ranges from 0 to 100.  
Best lagged referee score The best (lowest) average referee score for a full (second stage) 
proposal in t-1 to t-5. Ranges from 1 to 5.  
Years post degree This is the number of years since the researcher received their 
highest degree (generally PhD, excludes MD) and can be 
conceptualised as professional age.  
Dummy: Full FS in past 
five years 
Dummy equals 1 if investigator submitted a full (second stage) 
Fast-Start proposal in t-1 to t-5. 
FS*Contracts in past 5 
years 
Count of the number of contracts received in t-1 to t-5, if at least 
one FS proposal was submitted. Note: if an individual received a 
Fast-Start and a Standard contract during the same year both will 
be counted.  
Panel Dummies Nineteen panel dummies: equals 1 if proposal i is submitted to 
the corresponding panel. Twelve are for specific panels (e.g. MIS, 
ESA). Researchers involved in more than one panel during time t 
are classified in one of seven multidisciplinary panels. Details of 
the classification can be seen in the appendix. The panel dummy 
‘ALL’ is omitted from regressions. 
Time dummies Nine year dummies: equals 1 if t equals the corresponding year. 
2004 is omitted from regressions. 
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Table 5 presents descriptive statistics of these variables restricted to the sample of New 
Zealand based researchers  who have submitted a full (second stage) proposal in the preceding 
five years t=2004-2012. As can be observed, about 25% of researcher-years have zero 
publications and around 30% have zero citations. We therefore switch entirely to a count-data 
framework so as to avoid the log-log model that deals poorly with zeros. 
Table 5: Summary statistics on investigator-panel dataset 
Restricted to New Zealand based researchers who have submitted a full proposal in the preceding five 
years, 2004-2012. 
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Min Max N 
Count publications 3.135469 3.830887 0 46 9862
Count cites to publications 36.72034 90.65661 0 3134 9862
Normalised citations 3.609825 7.537339 0 182.5571 9862
Mean normalised cites past 5 yrs 3.153417 4.920935 0 80.91252 9862
Mean pubs past 5 yrs 2.72176 2.992051 0 28.2 9862
Sum contracts past 5 yrs 0.700061 0.777875 0 6 9862
Max lag full grade past 5 yrs 64.32144 22.96838 0 100 9862
Max lag full rank past 5 yrs 0.482743 0.311114 0 0.966667 9862
Min referee grade past 5 yrs 2.257098 0.968271 1 5 9862
Log(Mean pubs past 5 yrs) 0.591157 0.979442 -1.60944 3.339322 9862
Log(Mean norm cites past 5 yrs) 0.488354 1.251274 -4.97135 4.393369 9862
Sum full proposals past 5 yrs 1.734435 1.092492 1 8 9862
Sum prelim proposals past 5 yrs 3.792131 2.711005 0 26 9862
 
Percentage zeros 
% of 
researchers 
No publications time t 24.69%
No citations time t 30.71%
No publications in past 5 
years 8.48%
No citations past in 5 years 9.89%
 
4.2. Regression results 
We found that conditional over-dispersion in our data was inconsistent with the Poisson 
distributional assumption of equal mean and variance. A negative binomial distribution, 
which relaxes this assumption, was found to be a better fit for both citations and 
publications.   
Table 8 presents our baseline negative binomial regressions. Columns one through three 
regress current publications on the log of past publications (set to zero with a dummy correction 
equal to one if publications equals zero), the maximum scaled rank received on a full proposal in 
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the last five years, the professional age of the researcher and time and panel dummies under 
different distributional assumptions. 
Column one performs a standard negative binomial regression and clusters the errors 
around researchers to account for a lack of independently distributed observations. We see 
similar estimates of the coefficient on previous performance to those in the proposal-team 
analysis: 0.8 and highly statistically significant, suggesting persistent success with some mean 
reversion. The estimate on the zero past performance dummy, as would be expected, is negative 
indicating that those who have not published in the recent past are likely to publish less than 
those who have published an average of once per year over the past five years. The coefficient of 
0.0375 on contracts in the past five years, our estimated ‘treatment’ effect, can be approximately 
interpreted as each contract resulting in a publication rate in each of the subsequent 5 years 
3.75% higher than it otherwise would have been. Professional age (years post degree) has a 
statistically significant but quantitatively negligible effect on publication counts and there is a 
small yet significant estimated degree of over-dispersion. Yet again, the maximum full scaled 
rank received in the past five years has no predictive ability holding all else constant.  
Column two retains the same covariates and also incorporates researcher fixed effects, 
necessarily dropping those individuals with entirely zero outcomes in the process. 
Unsurprisingly, the coefficients on past performance change dramatically, as the individual fixed 
effect picks up most of the effect of lagged performance. The ‘treatment’ effect of receiving a 
contract increases slightly, although not significantly, to 0.045 suggesting that, if anything, 
omitting fixed effects provides a lower bound estimate of receiving funding. Our hypothesised 
control for selection bias, the maximum full scaled rank received in the past five years, turns 
negative and highly significant. 
Column three presents a zero inflated negative binomial regression with clustered errors. 
This model simultaneously maximises the likelihood of a negative binomial count model and a 
model of excess zeros to account for the high percentage of dependent variable observations 
equalling zero. The estimated coefficients in the negative binomial count regression are very 
similar to those from column one, with the exception of the past performance dummy whose 
estimated effect halves. The zero inflation regression uses a logit model to predict the binary 
outcome of an individual researcher having strictly zero publications or being included in the 
count regression. The coefficients rather intuitively suggest that not publishing in the previous 
five years greatly increases the probability of not publishing in a given year and the stronger a 
researcher’s average performance over the past five years, the less likely they will be unpublished 
in a given year. This model fits the data better than the non-zero-inflated version, but does not 
alter fundamentally the interpretation of the results.  
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Column four repeats column three’s zero inflated negative binomial model but with the 
addition of two variables: a dummy for submitting a second stage ‘Fast-Start’ in the previous five 
years and a count of the contracts received while the researcher was a second stage ‘Fast-Start’ 
applicant in the previous five years. This fourth regression is analogous to the ‘Fast-Start’ 
interaction models presented in section III and the results are qualitatively similar. A second 
stage ‘Fast-Start’ applicant, irrespective of funding, is on a steeper publication growth trajectory 
than ‘Standard’ applicants but the incremental effect of receiving ‘Fast-Start’ funding over 
‘Standard’ funding is statistically zero. 
Columns five through eight repeat these specifications using citations to papers 
published in a given year, normalised by year and panel, as the performance metric.  The simple 
negative binomial model in column five, as for publications, estimated strong persistent and 
mean reverting performance – as evidenced by a positive coefficient less than unity on past 
performance - and a strongly negative dummy correction for zero past citations. The impact of 
receiving a funded contract is estimated as an approximate 4.6% increase in annual citations for 
each of the subsequent five years, relative to what otherwise would have occurred. As this point 
estimate is higher than that for publications (~3.7%), it again suggests that the Marsden Fund 
modestly increases not only the quantity of publications but the average number of citations 
those publications receive. The maximum scaled full proposal rank received in the past five years 
remains statistically zero and professional age has a very minor estimated effect on citations per 
year.  
The normalised citations negative binomial fixed effect model, presented in column 6, 
varies from the baseline negative binomial in a similar manner to that of the publications version. 
The removal of the fixed effects component markedly changes the coefficient estimates on past 
performance, and the estimated treatment effect of funding increases to ~7.2% per year. The 
maximum scaled full rank remains statistically zero.  
Columns seven and eight present zero inflated negative binomial models for citations per 
year. The estimates of the ‘treatment’ effect are similar to the negative binomial model in column 
5 – funding generates a 5% to 5.5% increase in citations per year for the subsequent five years. 
As per the zero inflated logit model, an investigator with zero citations in the preceding five 
years is more likely to receive zero citations in the year in question and those with a recent 
history of more citations are less likely to be uncited. The addition of a ‘Fast-Start’ dummy and 
interaction with funding shows that ‘Fast-Start’ researchers are expected to be on a faster growth 
trajectory but the incremental effect of receiving a ‘Fast-Start’ grant, if anything, removes the 
funding effect (significant at the 10% level).  
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To assist with interpreting the effect of funding in the non-linear zero-inflated negative 
binomial model, Figure 3 uses regressions 4 and 8 to simulate a hypothetical researcher’s output 
trajectory under three funding scenarios. In scenario A, the baseline case, the researcher never 
receives funding and produces just under 2 papers per year that receive a normalised citation 
count of around 1.5. In scenario B, the researcher receives a Marsden contract in 2003 only. For 
the next five years, s/he benefits from a direct boost in output in the order of ~4% for 
publications and ~6% for normalised citations. From 2005 onwards, s/he additionally 
experiences a positive indirect effect from the increase in the lagged performance covariate. As 
performance is persistent, but mean reverting, we see the total treatment effect persists after the 
direct has ended, but this boost gradually dies out over time. Effectively, receiving a grant pushes 
a researcher onto a higher output trajectory from which s/he only gradually reverts to baseline 
performance.  
Our specification allows us to estimate the effects of multiple Marsden grants. Indeed, 
the mean researcher in our sample receives more than one grant, so scenario C simulates the 
cumulative effect of the researcher receiving a grant in 2003 and another in 2008. The impact of 
the second grant begins once the direct effect of the first finishes. The combined impacts of 
both grants results in a percentage increase over baseline for scenario C that peaks in 2013 at 
10% for publications and 14% for normalised citations. Because we do not find heterogeneous 
treatment effects, and the model is close to proportional, these percentage differences should be 
qualitative similar across different researchers. 
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Figure 3: Simulations of the Table 7 ZINB Regressions - a hypothetical researcher under 
three funding scenarios 
Scenario A: No funding (baseline) 
Scenario B: Funding in 2003 
Scenario C: Funding in 2003 and 2008. 
 
1: Simulated publication count trajectory, 1996-2016 
 
2: Simulated normalised citation count trajectory, 1996-2016.  
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4.3. Variations and Robustness 
Table 9 presents six zero inflated negative binomial models, three each for normalised 
citations and publications, that investigate various assessment metrics to control for selection 
bias. Columns one and four are the same as columns four and eight from Table 7 – they use the 
maximum scaled full rank received in the previous five years. Columns two and five switch to 
the maximum scaled full grade received in the past five years and columns three and six to the 
best average referee score of a full proposal in the past five years (note that 1 is the best grade 
and 5 the weakest). The coefficients change very little between the three publications regressions 
however the estimated treatment effect in terms of normalized citations increases when these 
alternate evaluation metrics are substituted for scaled rank. This illustrates that despite the 
absence of a clear selection effect, the magnitude of the estimated treatment effect is somewhat 
sensitive to conditioning in different ways on the programme’s evaluation. 
Table 10 includes four zero inflated negative binomial regressions with clustered errors 
that examine the lag structure of the dynamic panel and uncover some puzzling phenomena. 
Columns one and three, for publications and normalised citations respectively, separate the 
contracts received and the scaled ranks associated with full proposals by lags. When no full 
proposal was submitted in a given lag the scaled rank was set to zero and a dummy correction 
(not shown) was included to account for this. The lagged treatment effects are as one would 
expect. There is no impact of receiving a contract in the immediate year after funding however 
positive impacts on research output commence from the second year - ~8% for publications and 
~20% for normalised citations. The lags are highly correlated potentially rendering the model 
unable to separately identify the impacts of contracts received in lag three (and lag four for 
citations). For both publications and citations, the fifth lag turns significantly positive - likely 
picking up a long tail of the funding effect. The coefficient on lagged scaled rank, noisy even 
when aggregated over the past five years, is unable to be significantly estimated when separated 
out beyond lag two.  
Columns two and four, in response to a suspected long tail, move away from a five lag 
funding window and instead include as covariates the number of contracts received since 1996 
and the maximum scaled full rank ever received since 2003. The estimated effect of funding 
disappears and even turns statistically negative in the case of publications. Overall, there just 
does not seem to be a strong enough signal/noise ratio to really get a handle on the time lags in 
the process. 
Table 11 and Table 12 run zero inflated negative binomial models with clustered errors 
on panel subsamples of researchers. These are the individual-researcher equivalents to the panel 
regressions in part III. The eight largest panels were chosen and to be included in a given 
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regression, a researcher must have submitted a second stage proposal to the relevant panel in the 
preceding five years. Individuals who have submitted full proposals to two or more of these 
eight panels are included in more than one regression. As can be observed, the noise associated 
with small subsamples makes precise estimation difficult. For the publications regressions in 
Table 11, researchers involved with the Biomedical Sciences (BMS), Cellular, Molecular and 
Physiological biology (CMP), Ecology, Evolution and Behaviour (EEB) and Social Sciences 
(SOC) panels are estimated to experience positive funding effects ranging from ~6% to ~9% per 
year for 5 years. Researchers involved in other panels experience statistically zero funding effects. 
For normalised citations in Table 12, the regressions are noisier and only BMS has a statistically 
positive funding effect at ~12%. 
5. Summary and Conclusion 
All of the these estimation results are consistent with a modest but statistically robust 
boost in research output associated with receiving Marsden funding, although the statistical 
precision and exact size of the estimate depends on the empirical formulation.  The effect on 
citations is consistently larger than the effect on publications, suggesting that funding leads both 
to more papers and papers that are more highly cited.9  It is important to emphasize that what is 
captured here is a general impact on the publication/citation success of the researchers. It seems 
likely that Marsden funding shifts researchers’ focus to some extent towards the subject of the 
grant, so that the funding impact on research outputs directly related to the proposal would be 
greater than those estimated here, but our empirical framework does not allow us to measure 
that. 
We also cannot determine the extent to which the increase comes from direct use of the 
Marsden money versus indirect impact of Marsden success on researcher opportunities and 
resources.  Whether this is a weakness or strength of the findings depends on the question being 
asked.  The Marsden fund is the premier basic science funding mechanism in New Zealand, and 
participants certainly believe that Marsden success is a general certification of quality that often 
translates into broader success.  From the perspective of the Marsden Fund itself, it may make 
sense to attribute all of this success to Marsden. From the broader perspective of the social 
return to public science investment, the apparent benefit of Marsden funding may include 
double-counting of benefits associated with other public research funds, if part of the Marsden 
effect is greater success in receiving those other funds. 
                                                 
9 If citations/paper is used explicitly as the success measure, the funding dummy has the expected 
coefficient but it is not statistically significant. 
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While our initial intention was to include panel rank in the analysis to control for 
selectivity bias, we find no evidence of selection based on likely research success in the second 
round Marsden process. We have tested many different versions of how that selection might 
operate, including trying both panel scores and raw referee scores, testing for an effect with or 
without conditioning on prior performance, testing for a variety of non-linearities in the selection 
effect, and testing for predictive power of panel rank comparing proposals with the same 
funding status. There really seems to be nothing there. It is possible that some other evaluation 
mechanism would do a better job, but there are several reasons to believe that distinguishing 
among these proposals ex ante is very hard: 
• the inherent uncertainty of research success; 
• the two-step Marsden process means the panels are attempting to distinguish among the 
merits of proposals in the upper tail of the population; 
• the broad disciplinary coverage of the Marsden panels means that the panels are frequently 
comparing apples to oranges.10 
Given the significant researcher and RSNZ time and resources that are devoted to second-round 
selection, this suggests a potentially large misallocation of resources. 
Publications and citations are, of course, only proxies for research output.  One could 
argue that the lack of a positive correlation between ex ante evaluations and performance by these 
metrics reflects a specific effort by the panels to identify research proposals with a particular kind 
of potential that is not captured by these metrics.  We cannot rule out this possibility, but we find 
it hard to describe a plausible conception of the programme’s goals that, if successful, would not 
produce research that would be expected to be highly cited. 
The investigator-year analysis provides qualitatively similar results to those from the 
proposal-team quasi-experimental analysis.  We do not yet understand why the estimated funding 
effect is smaller for the researcher-year model (3-5% for publications and 5-8% for citations) 
than for the project-team model (6-15% for pubs and 22-26% for citations). These are, of 
course, not apples-to-apples comparisons, as the former is a change for each of the subsequent 5 
years, while the latter is an average percentage increase over the entire remaining observation 
period. The simulation results in Figure Four show that there is some additional benefit to 
funding that flows through the cumulative effect of performance on future performance. But 
this effect does not appear to be large enough to explain the difference. It is also true that the 
percentage benefit for the team as a whole is not arithmetically equivalent to the average 
                                                 
10 We speculate that this last factor likely explains the contrast between our results and those of Li and 
Agha (2015), who found that NIH peer review scores have significant explanatory power regarding subsequent 
performance, within the set of funded researchers. 
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percentage benefit enjoyed by each member of the team. But it remains puzzling that difference 
is systematic and apparently large. 
The two sets of results bracket those of Jacob and Lefgren (2011), who found an 
increase in publications of about 7%. They suggested that this relatively small effect was likely do 
to the variety of funding options available to NIH researchers in the U.S. It is hard to say 
conclusively, but it appears that there are fewer alternatives to Marsden funding for fundamental 
science research in New Zealand. Further, the Jacob and Lefgren results are for Individual 
Researcher (R01) grants, while research teams are a prominent aspect of the Marsden proposals. 
It is likely that the true importance of the Marsden grant varies significantly across the members 
of the team, in ways that are not captured very well by the recorded FTE figures. If so, this 
means that the treatment effect is measured with considerable error in the individual-year model, 
which implicitly assumes that every New Zealand researcher on a Marsden grant is affected by 
the grant in the same way. For the project-team analysis, this problem is greatly mitigated. It is 
much more reasonable to think that across research teams, the benefit of grant receipt is roughly 
the same for different teams, particularly since there is relatively little variation in the budget 
sizes. This line of thought suggests that the individual-year estimate of the treatment effect is 
biased downward, and the project team estimates may be more reflective of the true treatment 
effect. 
More generally, the analysis demonstrates the benefit of retaining and utilizing 
information on both successful and unsuccessful grant proposals. This basic strategy for 
identifying the treatment effect in the presence of potential selection bias is powerful in concept 
but very rarely applied in practice. 
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Appendix 
Year and Panel statistics from proposal-team dataset. 2003-2008. 
  
Number of 
Observations 
Dummy coefficient from Column 
4, Table 3 
2003 168 n.a. 
    (.) 
2004 195 0.250*** 
    (0.0752) 
2005 207 0.0891 
    (0.0737) 
2006 241 0.0385 
    (0.0748) 
2007 233 0.0174 
    (0.0746) 
2008 219 0.0418 
    (0.0777) 
BMS 145 n.a. 
    (.) 
CMP 167 -0.257*** 
    (0.0768) 
EEB 188 0.0248 
    (0.0746) 
EHB 61 -0.271*** 
    (0.105) 
ESA 122 -0.0697 
    (0.0825) 
HUM 96 -1.035*** 
    (0.134) 
MIS 118 -0.315*** 
    (0.0853) 
PSE 164 -0.0897 
    (0.0771) 
SOC 202 -0.516*** 
    (0.0791) 
 
Year and Panel statistics from researcher-panel dataset. 2004-2012. 
  
Number of 
Observations  
Dummy coefficient from Column 
8, Table 7 
2004 660 n.a. 
    (.) 
2005 876 0.0587 
    (0.0993) 
2006 1030 0.0666 
    (0.103) 
2007 1217 0.0420 
    (0.106) 
2008 1382 0.0923 
    (0.110) 
2009 1411 0.00930 
34. 
    (0.102) 
2010 1246 0.109 
    (0.108) 
2011 1101 0.169 
    (0.112) 
2012 939 0.445*** 
    (0.118) 
ALL 12 n.a. 
    (.) 
B&B 9 0.192 
    (0.460) 
BMS 1022 0.199 
    (0.352) 
CMP 893 0.176 
    (0.351) 
EEB 1201 0.278 
    (0.350) 
EHB 507 0.0782 
    (0.356) 
EIS 97 0.419 
    (0.368) 
ESA 1057 0.339 
    (0.356) 
HSC 306 0.170 
    (0.380) 
HUM 521 0.425 
    (0.402) 
LIF 397 0.352 
    (0.356) 
LPM 487 0.323 
    (0.355) 
LSH 125 0.719* 
    (0.384) 
MIS 610 0.440 
    (0.357) 
PCB 192 0.136 
    (0.363) 
PSE 824 0.352 
    (0.352) 
PSM 98 0.138 
    (0.379) 
SOC 1428 0.326 
    (0.356) 
SPM 76 0.354 
    (0.378) 
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Information on panels 
  Categories Research areas 
 Single panels 
MIS Mathematical and Information Sciences 
ESA Earth Sciences and Astronomy 
PSE Physical Sciences and Engineering 
EIS Engineering and Interdisciplinary Sciences 
PCB Physics, Chemistry and Biochemistry 
B&B Biochemical and biomedical sciences 
CMP Cellular, Molecular and Physiological biology 
EEB Ecology, Evolution and Behaviour 
BMS Biomedical sciences 
SOC Social Sciences 
HUM Humanities 
EHB Economics and Human Behaviour 
Broad areas 
LIF B&B+CMP+EEB+BMS Life sciences 
HSC SOC+HUM+EHB Humanities and social sciences 
PSM MIS+ESA+PSE+EIS+PCB Physical sciences and mathematics 
Across two 
broad areas 
LPM LIF+PSM Life sciences, physical sciences and mathematics 
LSH LIF+HSC Life sciences, humanities and social sciences 
SPM HSC+PSM Social sciences, humanities, physical sciences and mathematics 
All areas ALL LIF+HSC+PSM Broadly interdisciplinary 
 
For the proposal-team dataset, dichotomous variables for the nine panels in operation 
from 2003-2008 are included (MIS, ESA, PSE, CMP, EEB, BMS, SOC, HUM, EHB). 
For the investigator-panel dataset, nineteen dichotomous variables for panels are 
included. Twelve are for specific panels in operation during the timeframe (MIS, ESA, PSE, EIS, 
PCB, B&B, CMP, EEB, BMS, SOC, HUM, EHB). The remaining nine are grouped 
classifications relevant when a researcher was involved with more than one panel in a given year 
- either by submitting two or more proposals to separate panels and/or one proposal to two or 
more panels. The groupings are displayed in the table above.  
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Figure 4: Frequency distribution of annual publication and citation counts, 2004-2012 
A: Publications 
 
B: Citations to publications 
 
C: Citations to publications, normalised by year and panel 
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Table 6: Negative Binomial Regressions by panel (discipline) on proposal-team data – Publications 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
  BMS CMP EEB EHB ESA HUM MIS PSE SOC 
VARIABLES Pubs Pubs Pubs Pubs Pubs Pubs Pubs Pubs Pubs 
                    
Count regression:   
Log(Past 
Performance) 0.727*** 0.828*** 0.741*** 0.674*** 0.740*** 0.749*** 0.611*** 0.663*** 0.804*** 
  (0.0496) (0.0497) (0.0344) (0.0642) (0.0414) (0.0953) (0.0695) (0.0392) (0.0331) 
Dummy: Past 
Performance=0 -2.454 - - - - -2.01*** -2.562 -0.454 -2.10*** 
  (1.650) - - - - (0.365) (1.953) (0.775) (0.591) 
Funded 0.479*** 0.143 0.0794 0.260 -0.114 0.0963 0.222 0.00842 -0.0118 
  (0.129) (0.122) (0.0828) (0.186) (0.0747) (0.412) (0.205) (0.112) (0.108) 
Scaled rank -0.781*** -0.432** -0.0596 -0.480 0.0792 -0.0403 -0.330 0.0132 0.155 
  (0.211) (0.201) (0.136) (0.297) (0.134) (0.655) (0.333) (0.191) (0.178) 
Subsequent contract 0.0663 0.0430 0.0536 0.405*** -0.00946 -0.0432 0.296** 0.0883 0.0398 
  (0.0913) (0.0829) (0.0557) (0.138) (0.0566) (0.257) (0.138) (0.0768) (0.0711) 
Constant 0.800*** 0.678*** 1.043*** 1.087*** 1.004*** 0.563 1.237*** 1.073*** 0.711*** 
  (0.159) (0.142) (0.111) (0.164) (0.122) (0.380) (0.230) (0.131) (0.125) 
Overdispersion: 
lnalpha   
Constant -2.506*** -2.533*** -3.393*** -2.857*** -25.23 -4.659 -1.305*** -2.461*** -4.486*** 
  (0.264) (0.242) (0.307) (0.459) (0) (5.583) (0.182) (0.214) (1.310) 
Observations 145 167 188 61 122 96 118 164 202 
Log likelihood -398.5 -449.5 -547.0 -160.5 -325.3 -103.2 -361.6 -520.0 -406.4 
Time and panel dummies included in all regressions 
EHB began in 2006. Dummies for 2007/2008 only included 
No past performance dummy omitted from CMP EEB EHB and ESA as past publications values all positive 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7: Negative Binomial Regressions by panel (discipline) on proposal-team data – Citations 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
  BMS CMP EEB EHB ESA HUM MIS PSE SOC 
VARIABLES Cites Cites Cites Cites Cites Cites Cites Cites Cites 
                    
Count regression:   
Log(Past 
Performance) 0.420*** 0.689*** 0.628*** 0.539*** 0.669*** 0.665*** 0.679*** 0.763*** 0.766*** 
  (0.0663) (0.0453) (0.0336) (0.0424) (0.0514) (0.0725) (0.0468) (0.0459) (0.0360) 
Dummy: Past 
Performance=0 -2.377** - - - - -1.890*** -3.046 1.752** -1.706*** 
  (0.946) - - - - (0.416) (2.751) (0.734) (0.622) 
Funded 0.668*** 0.199 0.0956 -0.0984 0.127 -0.531 0.455** 0.241 0.522*** 
  (0.229) (0.158) (0.133) (0.236) (0.142) (0.491) (0.226) (0.183) (0.181) 
Scaled rank -0.951** -0.493* -0.0783 0.175 0.309 1.162 -0.577 -0.581* -0.411 
  (0.382) (0.257) (0.222) (0.381) (0.243) (0.760) (0.380) (0.303) (0.294) 
Subsequent contract 0.430*** 0.231** 0.165* 0.280 0.106 -0.0692 0.447*** 0.141 0.440*** 
  (0.160) (0.108) (0.0935) (0.185) (0.104) (0.319) (0.161) (0.119) (0.124) 
Constant 2.626*** 1.263*** 1.811*** 1.666*** 1.415*** -0.0230 1.140*** 0.928*** 0.543*** 
  (0.473) (0.277) (0.231) (0.245) (0.309) (0.538) (0.304) (0.288) (0.203) 
Overdispersion: 
lnalpha   
Constant -0.481*** -1.173*** -1.281*** -1.397*** -1.540*** -0.609** -0.718*** -0.953*** -0.755*** 
  (0.110) (0.108) (0.103) (0.189) (0.133) (0.275) (0.133) (0.108) (0.114) 
Observations 145 167 188 61 122 96 118 164 202 
Log likelihood -885.3 -951.5 -1135 -307.1 -705.0 -165.2 -580.9 -959.4 -830.8 
Time and panel dummies included in all regressions 
EHB began in 2006. Dummies for 2007/2008 only included 
No past performance dummy omitted from CMP EEB EHB and ESA as past citations values all positive 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 8: Baseline results investigator-panel data 
NB = Negative binomial  
NB FE = Negative binomial with fixed effects  
ZINB = Zero inflated negative binomial 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Pubs Pubs Pubs Pubs 
VARIABLES NB NB FE ZINB ZINB 
          
Count regression: 
  
Log(Average Performance over past 5 
years) 0.795*** -0.135*** 0.791*** 0.796*** 
  (0.0123) (0.0232) (0.0139) (0.0139) 
Dummy: Performance in past 5 years=0 -2.036*** 0.0927 -1.054*** -1.050*** 
  (0.110) (0.123) (0.232) (0.233) 
Number of contracts in past 5 years 0.0373*** 0.0453*** 0.0365*** 0.0341** 
  (0.0130) (0.0158) (0.0130) (0.0134) 
FS*Contracts in past 5 years - - - -0.0148 
  - - - (0.0536) 
Dummy: Full FS in past five years - - - 0.0959** 
  - - - (0.0435) 
Max lagged scaled rank -0.0310 -0.140*** -0.0296 -0.0226 
  (0.0408) (0.0464) (0.0409) (0.0409) 
Years post degree -0.0009*** -0.0003 -0.0009*** -0.0008*** 
  (0.000304) (0.00181) (0.000305) (0.000256) 
Constant 0.153 2.530*** 0.161 0.161 
  (0.202) (0.0913) (0.202) (0.204) 
Overdispersion: lnalpha 
Constant -1.683*** 2.530*** -1.721*** -1.730*** 
  (0.0509) (0.0913) (0.0696) (0.0674) 
Zero inflation regression 
Log(Average Performance over past 5 
years) - - -0.708*** -0.702*** 
  - - (0.140) (0.136) 
Dummy: Performance in past 5 years=0 - - 5.337*** 5.248*** 
  - - (1.583) (1.360) 
Constant - - -4.028*** -3.940*** 
  - - (1.142) (0.981) 
Observations 9,843 9,193 9,843 9,843 
Log likelihood -18425 -13072 -18407 -18400 
N Researchers   1,439     
ZINB and NB regression errors are clustered around researchers 
Time and panel dummies included in all count regressions 
Time dummies included in all zero inflation regressions 
Sample restricted to NZ based researchers with a full proposal in the previous 5 years 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 8: Baseline results investigator-panel data 
  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  Cites Cites Cites Cites
VARIABLES NB NB FE ZINB ZINB
          
Count regression:   
Log(Average Performance over past 5 
years) 0.692*** -0.0297 0.675*** 0.676*** 
  (0.0178) (0.0190) (0.0175) (0.0175) 
Dummy: Performance in past 5 years=0 -2.097*** 0.214 -0.518** -0.502* 
  (0.180) (0.143) (0.259) (0.258) 
Number of contracts in past 5 years 0.0459* 0.0724*** 0.0479* 0.0551** 
  (0.0251) (0.0220) (0.0249) (0.0243) 
FS*Contracts in past 5 years - - - -0.197* 
  - - - (0.103) 
Dummy: Full FS in past five years - - - 0.244** 
  - - - (0.0970) 
Max lagged scaled rank 0.0918 -0.145** 0.0846 0.105 
  (0.0733) (0.0648) (0.0723) (0.0725) 
Years post degree -0.0010*** - -0.0009*** -0.000879***
  (0.000214) - (0.000219) (0.000198) 
Constant 0.166 0.291*** 0.154 0.152 
  (0.339) (0.0541) (0.354) (0.353) 
Overdispersion: lnalpha 
Constant 0.0103 0.291*** -0.0966** -0.100** 
  (0.0402) (0.0541) (0.0420) (0.0410) 
Zero inflation regression 
Log(Average Performance over past 5 
years) - - -0.831*** -0.832*** 
  - - (0.101) (0.101) 
Dummy: Performance in past 5 years=0 - - 9.297*** 9.306*** 
  - - (1.182) (1.181) 
Constant - - -6.381*** -6.378*** 
  - - (0.966) (0.967) 
Observations 9,843 8,944 9,843 9,843 
Log likelihood -20025 -14115 -19844 -19833 
N Researchers   1,394 
ZINB and NB regression errors are clustered around researchers 
Time and panel dummies included in all count regressions 
Time dummies included in all zero inflation regressions 
Sample restricted to NZ based researchers with a full proposal in the previous 5 years 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 9: Comparison of selection metric – Zero inflated negative binomial regressions on 
investigator-panel data 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Pubs Pubs Pubs Cites Cites Cites 
          
Count regression:   
Log(Average Performance over 
past 5 years) 0.796*** 0.795*** 0.795*** 0.676*** 0.676*** 0.676*** 
  (0.0139) (0.0139) (0.0139) (0.0175) (0.0175) (0.0176) 
Dummy: Performance past 5 
yrs=0 -1.050*** -1.048*** -1.049*** -0.502* -0.503* -0.501* 
  (0.233) (0.233) (0.233) (0.258) (0.258) (0.259) 
Number of contracts in past 5 
years 0.0341** 0.0339*** 0.0315*** 0.0551** 0.0708*** 0.0794***
  (0.0134) (0.0120) (0.0114) (0.0243) (0.0216) (0.0211) 
FS*Contracts in past 5 years -0.0148 -0.0145 -0.0157 -0.197* -0.193* -0.190* 
  (0.0536) (0.0536) (0.0537) (0.103) (0.102) (0.102) 
Dummy: Full FS in past 5 years 0.0959** 0.0969** 0.0969** 0.244** 0.238** 0.237** 
  (0.0435) (0.0435) (0.0435) (0.0970) (0.0966) (0.0962) 
Max lag scaled rank -0.0226 0.105 
  (0.0409) (0.0725) 
Max lag percent grade -0.000389 0.000676 
  (0.000465) (0.000830)
Best lag referee score 0.00586 -0.000424 
  (0.0105) (0.0210) 
Years post degree -0.0008*** -0.0008*** -0.0008*** -0.0009*** -0.0009*** -0.0009***
  (0.000256) (0.000256) (0.000256) (0.000198) (0.000196) (0.000196)
Constant 0.161 0.166 0.138 0.152 0.134 0.135 
  (0.204) (0.204) (0.209) (0.353) (0.351) (0.366) 
Overdispersion: lnalpha 
Constant -1.730*** -1.730*** -1.730*** -0.100** -0.0998** -0.0998** 
  (0.0674) (0.0674) (0.0672) (0.0410) (0.0411) (0.0412) 
Zero inflation regression 
Log(Average Performance over 
past 5 years) -0.702*** -0.700*** -0.700*** -0.832*** -0.832*** -0.833*** 
  (0.136) (0.136) (0.136) (0.101) (0.101) (0.101) 
Dummy: Performance in past 5 
years=0 5.248*** 5.246*** 5.244*** 9.306*** 9.307*** 9.305*** 
  (1.360) (1.352) (1.344) (1.181) (1.181) (1.182) 
Constant -3.940*** -3.943*** -3.935*** -6.378*** -6.382*** -6.388*** 
  (0.981) (0.975) (0.970) (0.967) (0.967) (0.968) 
Observations 9,843 9,843 9,843 9,843 9,843 9,843 
Log likelihood -18400 -18400 -18400 -19833 -19834 -19835 
Regression errors are clustered around researchers 
Time and panel dummies included in all count regressions 
Time fixed dummies included in all zero inflation regressions 
Sample restricted to NZ based researchers with a full proposal in the previous 5 years 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
  
42. 
Table 10: Exploration of lag pattern – ZINB regressions on investigator-panel data 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Pubs Pubs Cites Cites 
Count regression:   
Log(Average Performance over past 5 
years) 0.791*** 0.796*** 0.668*** 0.674*** 
  (0.0143) (0.0138) (0.0208) (0.0210) 
Dummy: Performance in past 5 years=0 -1.047*** -1.063*** -0.548** -0.544** 
  (0.233) (0.232) (0.267) (0.265) 
Contracts lag 1 -0.00712 0.0168 
  (0.0385) (0.0827) 
Contracts lag 2 0.0814** 0.193*** 
  (0.0332) (0.0600) 
Contracts lag 3 0.0288 0.0183 
  (0.0294) (0.0558) 
Contracts lag 4 0.0595** 0.00500 
  (0.0299) (0.0536) 
Contracts lag 5 0.0598** 0.0976* 
  (0.0272) (0.0515) 
Numbers of contracts received since 
1996 -0.0166** 0.00971 
  (0.00804) (0.0139) 
max scaled rank lag 1 -0.0305 -0.0345 
  (0.0752) (0.151) 
max scaled rank lag 2 -0.166** -0.212* 
  (0.0690) (0.115) 
max scaled rank lag 3 0.00713 0.117 
  (0.0633) (0.111) 
max scaled rank lag 4 -0.0756 0.0695 
  (0.0617) (0.127) 
max scaled rank lag 5 -0.0518 -0.0326 
  (0.0663) (0.120) 
max scaled rank since 2003 (records 
began) 
0.0444*** 0.0307 
(0.0171) (0.0295) 
Years post degree -0.0008*** -0.0008*** -0.0009*** -0.0010*** 
  (0.000292) (0.000287) (0.000213) (0.000221) 
Constant 0.323 0.205 0.270 0.187 
  (0.215) (0.208) (0.366) (0.354) 
Overdispersion: lnalpha 
Constant -1.719*** -1.724*** -0.106** -0.0995** 
  (0.0736) (0.0666) (0.0435) (0.0428) 
Zero inflation regression 
Log(Average Performance over past 5 
years) -0.704*** -0.709*** -0.958*** -0.951*** 
  (0.144) (0.133) (0.156) (0.159) 
Dummy: Performance in past 5 years=0 5.648** 5.230*** 6.363*** 6.468*** 
  (2.353) (1.332) (1.911) (2.050) 
Constant -4.272** -3.881*** -4.213*** -4.258*** 
  (1.786) (0.977) (1.059) (1.149) 
Observations 9,843 9,843 9,843 9,843 
Log likelihood -18393 -18408 -19814 -19831 
Regression errors clustered around researchers, robust standard errors in parentheses.  
Sample restricted to NZ based researchers with a full proposal in the previous 5 years 
Time & panel dummies in count regressions, time dummies in zero inflated regressions 
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Table 11: Zero inflated negative binomial regressions by panel (discipline) on investigator-panel data: publications 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  BMS CMP EEB ESA HUM MIS PSE SOC 
VARIABLES Pubs Pubs Pubs Pubs Pubs Pubs Pubs Pubs 
                  
Count regression:   
Log(Average Performance over past 5 
years) 0.822*** 0.749*** 0.708*** 0.762*** 0.704*** 0.865*** 0.787*** 0.828*** 
  (0.0256) (0.0288) (0.0315) (0.0330) (0.0680) (0.0432) (0.0313) (0.0276) 
Dummy: Performance in past 5 
years=0 -0.478 -2.191*** -2.065* -1.059** -1.744*** -1.402*** -0.698 -0.748** 
  (0.471) (0.365) (1.123) (0.420) (0.563) (0.303) (0.489) (0.326) 
Number of contracts in past 5 years 0.0642** 0.0755*** 0.0582** 0.0266 0.201 -0.0308 -0.0116 0.0882** 
  (0.0298) (0.0256) (0.0234) (0.0277) (0.149) (0.0403) (0.0359) (0.0360) 
Max lagged scaled rank -0.139 -0.160* -0.000331 -0.0669 0.137 -0.00887 0.0502 0.0235 
  (0.0975) (0.0878) (0.0791) (0.104) (0.320) (0.138) (0.0993) (0.107) 
Constant 0.199** 0.241*** 0.470*** 0.504*** 0.137 0.555*** 0.468*** 0.186* 
  (0.0813) (0.0674) (0.0674) (0.0941) (0.303) (0.106) (0.0715) (0.103) 
Overdispersion: lnalpha   
Constant -1.896*** -1.939*** -1.818*** -1.673*** -0.911*** -1.569*** -1.807*** -1.864***
  (0.120) (0.159) (0.115) (0.128) (0.231) (0.135) (0.115) (0.191) 
Zero inflation regression   
Log(Average Performance over past 5 
years) -1.856*** -0.158 -0.580** 0.207 0.0545 -43.43*** -64.04*** -0.181 
  (0.703) (0.245) (0.262) (0.804) (0.397) (1.345) (3.500) (0.469) 
Dummy: Performance in past 5 
years=0 34.27*** -12.04*** 0.852 38.70*** 1.794 98.55*** 136.0*** 5.956*** 
  (1.064) (2.078) (11.21) (1.879) (2.479) (5.737) (7.081) (1.534) 
Constant -20.01*** -16.99*** -18.46*** -20.16*** -1.268 -54.94*** -75.44*** -4.179***
  (1.180) (0.571) (1.385) (1.715) (1.204) (1.867) (3.290) (1.612) 
Observations 1,534 1,632 1,861 1,404 699 853 1,426 2,170 
Log likelihood -3173 -3191 -3952 -2823 -653.3 -1847 -3179 -3073 
Regression errors clustered around researchers, robust standard errors in parentheses.  
Sample restricted to NZ based researchers with a full proposal submitted to the relevant panel in the previous 5 years 
Time & panel dummies in count regressions, time dummies in zero inflated regressions 
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Table 12: Zero inflated negative binomial regressions by panel (discipline) on investigator-panel data: citations 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  BMS CMP EEB ESA HUM MIS PSE SOC 
VARIABLES Cites Cites Cites Cites Cites Cites Cites Cites 
    
Count regression:   
Log(Average Performance over past 5 
years) 0.717*** 0.680*** 0.673*** 0.624*** 0.644*** 0.691*** 0.685*** 0.685*** 
  (0.0453) (0.0493) (0.0407) (0.0549) (0.0922) (0.0643) (0.0354) (0.0371) 
Dummy: Performance in past 5 years=0 -0.822 -0.522 -2.141*** 0.848 -0.861** -0.606 -1.597** -0.603 
  (0.515) (0.754) (0.411) (0.600) (0.417) (0.502) (0.682) (0.464) 
Number of contracts in past 5 years 0.125** 0.0670 0.0545 0.0364 -0.120 0.0432 0.0185 0.0935 
  (0.0566) (0.0467) (0.0463) (0.0597) (0.249) (0.0783) (0.0577) (0.0690) 
Max lagged scaled rank -0.0579 -0.150 0.236 0.243 0.206 -0.131 0.0518 0.130 
  (0.146) (0.149) (0.150) (0.221) (0.558) (0.228) (0.144) (0.188) 
Constant 0.228* 0.182* 0.431*** 0.755** 0.543 0.739*** 0.535*** 0.0794 
  (0.137) (0.100) (0.108) (0.323) (0.609) (0.173) (0.0984) (0.145) 
Overdispersion: lnalpha   
Constant -0.309*** -0.139 -0.229*** -0.0759 1.459*** 0.0185 -0.382*** 0.179** 
  (0.0919) (0.0872) (0.0705) (0.115) (0.141) (0.164) (0.0719) (0.0737) 
Zero inflation regression   
Log(Average Performance over past 5 
years) -1.156** -2.948*** -0.520*** -1.119*** -5.181** -0.977*** -0.960*** -0.814***
  (0.490) (0.888) (0.196) (0.322) (2.420) (0.300) (0.254) (0.199) 
Dummy: Performance in past 5 years=0 69.12 24.74*** 36.28*** 42.42 35.48*** 6.267*** 32.53*** 20.61*** 
  (2.137) (1.758) (7.836) (2.044) (0.652) (0.816) 
Constant -18.71*** -23.53*** -24.07*** -18.97*** -12.21** -5.490*** -17.69*** -18.06***
  (0.562) (2.035) (1.884) (0.501) (5.432) (1.044) (0.358) (0.886) 
Observations 1,534 1,632 1,861 1,404 699 853 1,426 2,170 
Log likelihood -3550 -3469 -4215 -3079 -658.7 -1872 -3291 -3371 
Regression errors clustered around researchers, robust standard errors in parentheses.  
Sample restricted to NZ based researchers with a full proposal submitted to the relevant panel in the previous 5 years 
Time & panel dummies in count regressions, time dummies in zero inflated regressions 
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